Abstract
The keynotes of our research are:
The systems of quasi-judicature in the United States and Japan have some characteristics in the organization, purview, and proceeding of the remedy. There are:
In theory, the system on a legal
remedy must go with the organization, purview, function and proceeding. It's
hard to separate the legal remedy from other systems and legislate by themselves.
The organization of the FTC is only independent partly. The Premier of the Executive
Yuan gives a mention and the President appoints them as Commissioners of the
FTC. The purviews of the FTC have the administrative power and quasi-legislative
power, but without quasi-judicial power. The proceeding of administration in
Administrative Procedure Act is no differences from the discipline of Laws of
Administrative Petition. The Commissioners of the FTC make decisions on cases
with profession. Other administrative and judicial departments shouldn't reject
the discipline and they should respect the professional decision-making of the
FTC. But it is hard to exempt the procedure of appeal by this reason. The point
is that the independent of the FTC is abstract and partly, but lacking of quasi-judicial
power. Without this, the decision of the FTC cannot be the quasi-judicial decision.
If the FTC can hold the hearings about the decision-making cases, the FTC can
exempt the procedure of appeal based on Article 109 of the Administrative Procedure
Act. After all the Administrative Procedure Act is the minimum protection in
the administrative procedure. If the FTC will revise the law, they should legislate
the more safeguard laws than the laws of procedure of FTC. If we can do that,
the procedure of appeal can be exempted.
This research suggests that the FTC can modify the whole Fair Trade Law and
other related laws step by step based on short-term and long-term targets respectively.