Abstract
In this project, we
intend to explore the issue concerning whether the Fair Trade Commission (FTC)
should have the additional authority to mandate a price reversal to the pre-violation
level when the alleged non-competitive prices resulting from collusion or
the abuse of the violators dominant market positions remain intact even after
they have been punished and have ended their inappropriate competing behavior.
We approached this issue by relying on the experience of the United States,
Germany, and the European Union to examine whether this issue had ever been
presented to and decided by the enforcement agencies and the courts in those
countries. In particular, we focus on whether their experience could be translated
into our legal system to support or disapprove the extension of the FTC's
power to set the prices for industries not subject to rate regulations. In
addition, whether private antirust litigation is capable of functioning equivalently
as an alternative to price reversal in terms of the maintenance of market
competition and the protection of consumers will also be elaborated upon in
this project. We concluded our research by presenting tentative but concrete
suggestions to the FTC on what could be done to resolve this issue, and in
what manners.